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Introduction

Paul Ricoeur is one of the most original and provocative philosophers
writing today. He is best known for his work in philosophy of language,
psychology, historiography, social science method, literary theory, and re
ligious studies. At a time when the usefulness of disciplinary boundaries
is being questioned, Ricoeur’s prodigious oeuvre is animated by a spirit
of interdisciplinary interrogation that generates original insights into many
of the most challenging intellectual and cultural issues we currently face.
His wide-ranging studies bridge modes of inquiry that have long existed in
isolation from one another, making his work field-encompassing without
lacking depth, rigorously argued without being hegemonistic.
Ricoeur is a philosopher of conversation and mediation. He embodies
the Socratic dictum that truth is a dialogic event as he seeks maieutically to
bring forth a variety of possible perspectives on the questions under discus
sion. His charitable interpretations of diverse positions reflect a wide and
generous philosophical style that allows him to uncover the often hidden
middle ground between the factions that characterize contemporary intel
lectual life. But his attempts at rapprochement never purchase mediation
at the price of ignoring important differences. Rather, Ricoeur’s aim is pa
tiently to track the topography of a particular debate in order to articulate
a via media (often unseen by the disputants) by which one can negoti
ate the questions at hand. Truth—or better, deeper insight into hitherto
unforeseen possibilities—emerges as a result of this careful tracking pro
cess. Truth happens in the space opened up in the conversation between
newly found dialogue partners—whether those dialogue partners be human
interrogators, literary texts, works of art, or cultural artifacts.
“Beyond the desert of criticism we wish to be called again.In spite
of (or to spite?) the death of God and the demystification of the cosmos,
Ricoeur’s dialogic thought echoes with a longing for spiritual values and
forces once felt by primordial peoples but now forgotten in a technologi
cal age. An authentic response to the question Who am I? is founded, in
part, on a recovery of the sacred by taking up residence in the worlds of
1. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967), 349.
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mythopoetic literature, such as the Bible. Ricoeur well knows that a simple
return path back to the powers of traditional religions is no longer tenable.
But his writing is characterized, nevertheless, by a fragile hope that in the
borderlands beyond calculative reason there might be a world of transcen
dent possibilities (mediated through the text) that can refigure and remake
the world of the reader. The recovery of the power of myth and symbol
is possible only through a self-critical, always revisable, and never certain
hermeneutical wager. By risking this wager, the interpreter advances, even
perhaps realizes, the task of becoming an integrated self. The first naivete
of primordial openness to religious symbolism has long been lost to modern
people, but a second naivete of belief founded on the traces of the sacred
in the world of the text is possible.
In the first half of this introduction I offer a chronological reading of Ricoeur’s intellectual biography with special reference to his work in religious
studies. In the second half I conclude with comments concerning the scope
and rationale of this anthology. I unify my exposition around a distinctively
Ricoeurian thesis: the journey to selfhood is made possible by the subject’s
willingness to receive new ways of being through its interactions with the
text-worlds of literature, myth, and religion.

Intellectual Biography
Early Development
Paul Ricoeur was born in Valence, France, on February 27, 1913, and
raised by his grandparents in Brittany in the minority tradition of the Prot
estant Huguenots. He graduated with the Agregation de Philosophic from
the Sorbonne in 1935 and attended seminars conducted by Gabriel Mar
cel. From 1940 to 1945 he was interned in a German POW camp, where
he was allowed to study German philosophy and theology, including the
works of Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heideg
ger, Karl Jaspers, Rudolf Bultmann, and Karl Barth. After the war he taught
the history of philosophy at the University of Strasbourg (1948-57) and re
turned to the Sorbonne to occupy the chair of metaphysics (1956-1967).
He was active in the Parisian socialist movement and the promotion of so
cial democracy against the threat of market-driven capitalism. He wrote
numerous articles for France’s left-wing Christian journals—in particular.
Esprit and Le Christianisme social—on the power of religious socialism to
engender community and solidarity and overcome the alienation of modern
urban life.^ In the 1940s and 1950s he became especially well known for
2. Some of this material is in English translation. See Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth,
trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965), and Political and
Social Essays, ed. David Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1974).
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his writings in existential phenomenology and as both a translator of and
commentator upon Husserl’s thought.^
In these early studies Ricoeur argues for Husserl’s methodologically
controlled reflection in the Logical Investigations as a more rigorous ex
tension of Marcel’s existentialism. He agrees with Husserl that the value
of phenomenological method lies in its description of consciousness to be
a consciousness of something, a moving outside of oneself to the object
or phenomenon intended. He avers, however, that Husserl’s later work
replaces the description of phenomena given to consciousness with the el
evation of the transcendental ego’s powers of unmediated perception of
the world. Because all understanding is determined by one’s historically
situated presuppositions concerning the external world, Ricoeur main
tains that Husserl’s idealizing tendencies must be resisted by a philosophy
that grafts the hermeneutics of signs and symbols onto the trunk of the
phenomenological description of intentional objects.
This movement toward a “hermeneutical phenomenology” is anticipated
in the second installment of a tripartite series by Ricoeur on the philoso
phy of the will. The first part consists of the volume Freedom and Nature:
The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1950; Eng. trans. 1966), in which
Ricoeur utilizes phenomenological method to describe the volitional and
nonvolitional structures of the will. The second part consists of two sep
arate books. Fallible Man (1960; Eng. trans. 1965) and The Symbolism
of Evil (1960; Eng. trans. 1967), and the third part, now permanently
suspended, was intended to be a poetics of the will. Although this third
volume is technically in abeyance, the goal of this book—to develop a
hermeneutical philosophical anthropology beyond the confines of phenom
enology—has been realized by Ricoeur’s subsequent writings, especially
his most recent Oneself as Another (1990; Eng. trans. 1992). His many
“detours,” as he calls them, since the 1950s into psychoanalysis, struc
turalism, analytic philosophy, social theory, discourse analysis, narratology,
and deconstruction have left him uninterested in formally completing the
projected poetics of the will. The value of these detours, however, is that
they have enabled Ricoeur to articulate a more complicated discordantconcordant understanding of human being than was available to him at
the time he had projected finishing his trilogy.
All his early writings on the structure of the will make the same claim:
human beings are tethered between freedom and nature, between the self3. See inter alia Paul Ricoeur and Michel Dufrenne, Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de
I’existence (Paris: Seuil, 1947), and Paul Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers (Paris:
Temps Present, 1948). Ricoeur translated into French with commentary volume 1 of
Husserl’s Ideas in 1950; also see Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology,
ed. and trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ.
Press, 1967).
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transcending powers of the imagination and the always limiting character
of perspectival, fragmented experience. The possibility of an undivided self,
the task of becoming a “whole soul,” begins with reflective analysis on
these two poles. Through this analysis, a self in possession of itself is “won”
by a fragile mediation of the consciousness of freedom and the brokenness
of unfulfilled desire. Selfhood is a task to be performed, not a given that
awaits passive reception by the subject.
Fallible Man maintains that the always already disproportion between
freedom and finitude is the constitutional weakness that makes evil pos
sible. Content with an exposition of the limit-concept of fallibility, this
study does not push forward to an analysis of the concrete manifesta
tions of fault in the human condition. This further analysis is deployed in
The Symbolism of Evil, the companion volume to Fallible Man, where the
turn is accomplished from a phenomenological (eidetic) description of the
faulted disproportion in human being to an interpretation (hermeneutic)
of symbols and myths concerning actual evil. “First of all, my investiga
tion into the Symbolism of Evil, which followed upon the Voluntary and
the Involuntary and Fallible Man, carried me to the heart of the herme
neutical tradition. For in the case of evil there is no direct concept but, to
begin with, symbols, narratives, myths, instead.In The Symbolism of Evil
Ricoeur takes up his central question, “What is the meaning of human be
ing?” by submerging his analysis in the opaque worlds of story and symbol.
The problem of noncoincidence with oneself is again manifest, but now in
a mythological register: to be human is to be estranged from oneself be
cause all humans, though destined for fulfillment, are inevitably captive to
an “adversary” greater than themselves. The bitter irony of this predica
ment is most effectively symbolized by the myth of Adam’s fall. Though
the story is putatively about historical origins, it functions as an etiologi
cal myth about a cosmic battle between good and evil already anterior to
Adam’s decision. Adam is figured as alternately responsible for his own free
decision and yet in bondage to an evil power outside of himself. Thus as
both free and determined, human beings, like Adam, are “responsible and
captive, or rather... responsible for being captive.”^
The Symbolism of Evil brings religious studies to the threshold of a
new methodology as a hermeneutical, rather than a strictly philosophical
or dogmatic, discipline. Religious studies is a public inquiry into the mean
ing of symbolic discourses, not a rationalist justification of religious beliefs
or a confessionalist defense of traditional doctrines. Ricoeur argues for the
premier value of mythopoetic forms of expression, rather than purely philo4. Paul Ricoeur, “My Relation to the History of Philosophy,” The lliff Review 35
(1978): 9.
5. Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 101.
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sophical or theological modes of discourse, for understanding the meaning
of human being in a world charged with the presence and absence of the
sacred. The relative superiority of myth over philosophy—or “fiction” over
“reason”—is manifest in the power of religious creation stories to uncover
the structural disparity in human beings between their fractured nature and
their destinies as integrated selves. This disparity can be imagined only
indirectly on the basis of mythical imagery; it cannot be studied directly
through a rationalist analysis of human history and-culture. The myths of
the Hebrews and Greeks concerning primordial chaos, primeval fall, origi
nal defilement, exile from paradise, tragic fate, and the servile will contain
a surplus of meaning hostile to modes of intellectual inquiry that a priori
deny to myths and symbols any truth-value concerning the nature of the
human condition. The point is not that religious symbolism is irrational or
unamenable to philosophical inquiry, but that the rationality of the sym
bol is available only to the theorist who values the efficacy of mythical
literatures.
“The symbol gives rise to thought, and thought returns to the symbol.”^
Ricoeur defines the symbol as a multiple-meaning expression characterized
by a hidden logic of double reference. Symbols are like signs in that they
intend something beyond themselves. But whereas the sign possesses a rel
atively obvious and conventional set of denotations, the symbol’s meanings
are polysemic, difficult to discern, and virtually inexhaustible in depth. Ri
coeur uses the example of the symbol “defilement” to make this point.
“Defilement” is a double-meaning expression in which the clear, literal
meaning stands for the state of physical uncleanliness, while the opaque,
figurative meaning “points beyond itself to something that is like a stain
or spot,”^ as when one refers to ritual impurity or moral evil as a “stain”
or “blemish” on one’s character. Because the symbol possesses a figura
tive reference, it demands interpretation in a way that the transparent sign
does not.
Ricoeur maintains that human beings enter consciousness as prior deni
zens of a world of symbols and myths. Figurative language first interprets
us before we interpret it. Since there are no “shortcuts” to selfhood, only
when the subject traverses a hermeneutical “long route” through the .reveal
ing power of the symbol can she or he enlarge and empower a fuller and
more satisfying understanding of the self. This route follows a path from
the loss of original belief in the sacred to a critical recovery of the power
of myth in a world empty of meaning and hope. “Does that mean that
we could go back to a primitive naivete? Not at all. In every way, some
thing has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of belief. But if we can
6. Ibid., 347-57.
7. Ibid., 15.
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no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the
original belief in them, we can, we modern men, aim at a second naivete
in and through criticism. In short, it is by interpreting that we can hear
again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the
endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.”* A critical
consciousness needs the complement of a mature openness to the symbolic
world; a hermeneutic of suspicion operates in productive tension with a
hermeneutic of restoration. In this dialectic the voice of the sacred can be
heard again, not in the mode of a precritical naivete but by an interpretive
gesture, a second naivete, that wagers on the power of myth and symbol to
elucidate the nature of human being.
The Hermeneutical Turn
In 1967 Ricoeur left the Sorbonne and joined the faculty of the University
of Paris at Nanterre, where he was later appointed dean in 1969. At Nanterre he was instrumental in mediating the conflicts between faculty and
students over the cries for reform in the French university system during the
Paris uprisings of 1968. He did collaborative work with Emmanuel Levinas
and was one of Jacques Derrida’s teachers. At this time he also became a
permanent faculty member of the University of Chicago with appointments
in the Divinity School, the Department of Philosophy, and the Committee
on Social Thought. He resigned from Nanterre in 1980 and continues as
professor emeritus at Chicago.
After the appearance of The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur has published
only one book-length project primarily devoted to the study of religion.^
Rather, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed his attempts systematically to work
out a general theory of interpretation (with regional application to re
ligious studies) in the light of the “hermeneutical turn” in his thought.
Three books (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation [1965;
Eng. trans. 1970], The Rule of Metaphor [1975; Eng. trans. 1978], and
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning [1976]) and
as many collections of essays (History and Truth [1955, 1964; Eng. trans.
1965], The Conflict of Interpretations [1969; Eng. trans. 1974], and The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work [1978]) develop
8. Ibid., 351.
9. See Paul Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 (1975): 29-148, where Ricoeur
analyzes the parables of Jesus as refigurations of time at its limits; the parables display
before the imagination the eternal and extravagant in the midst of the everyday. For another
large-scale writing in religion, there is also his unpublished Sarum Lectures from Oxford
University, 1980, on the topic of biblical interpretation and narrative theology. A small
section of this manuscript, roughly pages 8-36, is included below in a revised form in
“Biblical Time.”
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further theories of the imagination and the text beyond his earlier concern
with myth and symbol.
These studies begin with a detour through psychoanalysis over the
question of whether a restorative hermeneutics is possible after Freud’s
reconstruction of the human as a source of conflicted desires and unre
solved forces. Earlier Ricoeur had written that the subject can construct
a new identity through its commerce with self-generated figures of the
imagination. The subject can experience “redemption through imagina
tion” because in “imagining his possibilities, man can act as a prophet of
his own existence.”'® But now Ricoeur follows Freud’s description of the
imagination, or consciousness, as a projection of unconscious distortions
and impulses, or false consciousness. The subject who thinks and feels and
dreams is a “wounded cogito” riddled with illusions of freedom and selfsufficiency. Nevertheless, Freud’s location of the origins of the subject in
false consciousness must be positioned against a similar projection of sym
bols and figures of a new humanity. In the dialectical spirit of his aborted
poetics of the will, Ricoeur contends that an archaeology of the decentered
subject should stand in tension with a teleology of the fulfilled subject that
takes seriously, though not literally, childhood dreams, works of art, and re
ligious symbols as lived possibilities for a transformative future. In spite of
its overdetermined origins, the imagination can activate these possibilities
and offer the broken subject new modes of being in the world.
Ricoeur’s work from this period makes three points concerning the rela
tionship between philosophical inquiry and religious faith. First, authentic
faith emerges by way of its circuitous travels through a sustained her
meneutics of suspicion. What a Marx or a Nietzsche or a Freud offers
the believing community is a panoply of iconoclastic devices for smashing
the idols of belief naively unaware of its origins in certain systemic dis
tortions—be those distortions economic, philosophical, or psychodynamic.
But “to smash the idols is also to let the symbols speak.”" In the ten
sion between iconoclasm and belief—or distanciation and appropriation, as
Ricoeur sometimes puts it—the believer’s presuppositions are productively
challenged even as the critic’s assumptions are put to the test. Since the acid
bath of criticism is mutually purifying for both modes of inquiry, neither
the critic nor the believer emerges unscathed from this dialectical encounter.
“The faith of the believer cannot emerge intact from this confrontation, but
neither can the Freudian conception of reality.”'^ The burden of faith is to
10. Paul Ricoeur, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” in History and Truth, 127.
11. Paul Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An
Anthology of His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston: Beacon Press,
1978), 219.
12. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1970), 551.
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evoke a refined passion for the possible by way of an excavation of the
distortions at the base of its origins.
Second, the metaphorical imagination is an ally for the understanding
and articulation of faith. In its essence, faith is a living out of the figures of
hope unleashed by the imagination. Glossing Kant, Ricoeur argues for the
power of the productive imagination to “schematize” novel relationships
between the data of experience and the figures of the imagination even
though both realms of understanding seem initially unrelated to one an
other. The imagination generates new metaphors for synthesizing disparate
aspects of reality that burst conventional assumptions about the nature of
things. Figurative discourses suspend first-order references to literal objects
and events in order to liberate second-order references to a more basic
and nonliteral world of unimagined possibilities. The role of the living
metaphor is to juxtapose two dissimilar forms of articulation in order to
bring to language dimensions and values of reality that have been previ
ously hidden by straightforward, descriptive discourse. “[Mjetaphor is the
rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fic
tions have to redescribe reality.”^^ “Lamb” and “God,” for example, are
two distinct terms that resist combination. But the union of both terms in
the metaphor “lamb of God” sets free a new understanding of the divine
life—as bloody and innocent salvation-bringer—hitherto unavailable to the
interpreter apart from this metaphorical innovation.
Third, the power of the text to disclose new possibilities offers the reader
an expanded view of the world and a deeper capacity for selfhood. “It is
the text, with its universal power of world disclosure, which gives a self to
the ego.”'"* On this point Ricoeur’s lively dialogue with his critics comes to
the fore. As he counters some analytic philosophers’ arguments against the
truth-value of poetic texts, he also disagrees with certain literary theorists’
contention that such texts operate within a self-enclosed, private universe
that makes no purchase on everyday experience. His point is that the vast
majority of poetic texts do refer to the world, though not the world ac
cessible to thoroughgoing positivism and aestheticism, but the world now
refigured under the tutelage of the imaginary and the possible. Poetic lan
guage does intend reality—it is not a language unto itself divorced from any
referential function—but its power of reference is the power to set forth
novel ontologies that disorient readers in order to reorient them by way of
an ever-expanding vision of the whole.
In theological parlance, Ricoeur maintains that a variety of nonreligious
and religious fictions (including the Bible) are potentially revelatory—not
13. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin
and John Costello (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), 7.
14. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Interpretation of Meaning
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), 95.
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in the sense that they are deposits of divinely inspired truths but because
they faithfully enact a productive clash, and sometimes a fusion, between
their world and the world of the reader. Ricoeur understands revelation in
performative, not propositional, terms: it is an event of new meaning be
tween text and interpreter, rather than a body of received doctrines under
the control of a particular magisterium. He refers to the disclosive power
of figurative (including sacred) texts as an “areligious sense of revelation”
just insofar as any poetic text—by virtue of its powers of metaphorical ref
erence—can become a world that I inhabit and within which I project my
innermost possibilities. The world of the text can figure the identity of the
sacred and reveal dimensions of the human condition as such for any reader
who risks her own self-understanding in the process.^^
Ricoeur’s analysis of the referential function of literary works is an ex
tension and correction of the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Heidegger maintains that works of art reveal the character of re
ality by disclosing to the observer the “world” depicted in the art work.
Vincent van Gogh’s paintings of peasant shoes, for example—with their
separated soles, frayed threads, and protruding nails—distill the very es
sence of working-class life in late nineteenth-century France. “The art work
opens up in its own way the Being of beings.”'^ Aesthetic objects offer di
rect access to the nature of Being. With some qualifications Gadamer agrees
with Heidegger’s thesis concerning the truth of art; he further specifies its
application in terms of a “fusion of horizons” between the world of the
reader and the world of the text.'^ Understanding occurs in the to-and-fro
dialogue between text and interpreter whenever the interpreter is willing
to be put into question by the text and risk openness to the world of
possibilities the text projects.
While Ricoeur consistently appropriates these insights into the truthvalue of art and the dynamics of horizon-fusion, he enters a caveat against
a certain romanticist bias against explanation in the German hermeneutical
tradition from Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey to Heidegger
and Gadamer. This tradition has labored against the importation of reduc
tionist methods from nonhumanistic disciplines for the understanding of
literary texts and other works of art. While this prohibition has rightly
preserved the truth-bearing integrity of creative works, it has wrongly
insulated the interpretation of these works from a full and critical evalu
ation of their origins and interactions with structures of domination and
15. Paul Ricoeur, “Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,” Harvard Theologi
cal Review 70 (1977): 26.
16. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings, ed. David
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 166.
17. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 300-311.
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oppression. Ricoeur has learned from Jurgen Habermas that a pure con
versational model for textual understanding is not enough in the face
of the systematic distortions that undermine open dialogue and under
standing. Here again Ricoeur articulates the need for both rehabilitative
and critical interpretive gestures; no text is free from ideological distor
tion, and a romantic hermeneutic that blunts the uncovering of such bias
is dangerously short-sighted.^® In order for a fusion between text-world
and the reader’s world to be efficacious, no critical explanatory device
should be excluded from the interpretation process as long as that de
vice does not in principle deny the ontological potential of the work in
question. Ricoeur’s consistent motto, succinctly expressed in his recent
work, is “[T]o explain more is to understand better.”^’ Though mindful of
the hermeneutical tradition’s truth-claims concerning aesthetic media, Ri
coeur replaces their “short route” of direct access to Being with his “long
detours” of successive methodological requirements for understanding
works of art.
The Recovery of Narrative
I have suggested that The Sytnbolistn of Evil (as well as other works from
the 1950s and early 1960s) inaugurates an expansion beyond the analysis
of the structure of the divided will so characteristic of Ricoeur’s immediate
postwar writings: a hermeneutic of opaque symbols is now grafted onto the
phenomenological method. Likewise, The Rule of Metaphor marks a shift
from Ricoeur’s earlier depth readings of myth and symbol to a general in
terpretation theory that presses a variety of reductive hermeneutics into the
service of a more complicated philosophical anthropology. “Today I should
be less inclined to limit hermeneutics to the discovery of hidden meanings in
symbolic language and would prefer to link hermeneutics to the more gen
eral problem of written language and texts.
Ricoeur’s writings from the
1980s to the present signify still a third stage in his itinerary: the challenge
of narratology and deconstruction. The current major texts include Time
and Narrative (3 vols., 1983-85; Eng. trans. 1984-88), Lectures on Ideol
ogy and Utopia (1986), and Oneself as Another (1990; Eng. trans. 1992).
He has also authored papers that have been collected as Essays on Biblical
Interpretation (1980), Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981), From
Text to Action (1986; Eng. trans. 1991), A Ricoeur Reader; Reflection and
18. See Ricoeur’s mediation of the debate between Gadamer’s use of German romanticism
and Habermas’s critical philosophy in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” in
Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 63-100.
19. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols., trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David
Pellauer (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984-88), 2:32.
20. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 317.
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Imagination (1991), and Lectures (3 vols., 1991-1994). With these recent
works in mind a distinctive pattern can be traced in Ricoeur’s oeuvre. His
thought has followed a trajectory from his initial analysis of the bad will
and the power of symbolic language to a comprehensive hermeneutical
model now complemented by an emerging theory concerning the role of
narrative in the formation of subjectivity.
“[T]ime becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after
the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent
that it portrays the features of temporal experience.
The importance of
narrative in understanding human temporality is the leitmotif of Ricoeur’s
recent thought. His previous work had spoken to the power of myths, sym
bols, and other figurative discourses in the mediation of consciousness; his
current work argues that the desire to be, the task of existence, is insep
arable from the scripting of an individual story that gathers together the
untold and sometimes repressed narrative fragments constitutive of per
sonal identity. Everyone needs a story to live by in order to make sense
of the pastiche of one’s life. Without a narrative a person’s life is merely a
random sequence of unrelated events: birth and death are inscrutable, tem
porality is a terror and a burden, and suffering and loss remain mute and
unintelligible.
Ricoeur’s use of narrative as a solution to the problem of identity is
founded on the dialectic between history and fiction analyzed in Time and
Narrative. While he recognizes the differences between history and fiction,
he argues that both forms of writing are united by their common reference
to the fundamentally historical and temporal character of human existence.
One may think of history and fiction as presenting opposing referential
claims: history intends a lawlike description of past events, while fiction
refers to the unrealities of the imagination that bear little relationship to
everyday life. Ricoeur rejects this dichotomy and argues instead that “in
spite of the evident differences in the way that history and fiction are re
lated to ‘reality’—in whatever sense of the word—they refer nonetheless,
each in its own way, to the same fundamental feature of our individual
and social existence. This feature is characterized in very different philoso
phies by the term ‘historicity,’ which signifies the fundamental and radical
fact that we make history, that we are immersed in history, that we are
historical beings.
He continues that history and fiction share a common
narrative structure with a shared reference to the field of human action.
The concept of plot—or rather “emplotment,” as he prefers—is the link
ing idea that holds together both forms of writing. Emplotment is the art
21. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:3.
22. Paul Ricoeur, “The Narrative Function,
274.

in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,
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of “eliciting a pattern from a successionit is the ability to configure
episodic and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality. The plot
sets up a sequence of events and characters, whether real or imaginary, in a
certain directed movement under the control of a particular point of view.
Emplotment is a historical or literary text’s capacity to set forth a story that
combines the givens of contingent historical existence with the possibilities
of a meaningful interpretation of the whole.
Ricoeur’s thesis concerning the role of emplotment as the underlying
principle of both history and fiction challenges some fundamental assump
tions. First, history contains more “fiction” than a positivist model of
history would allow. Insofar as history is a form of writing that seeks coher
ence in the chaos of real events, and not simply a disconnected recounting
of these events, history, like fiction, is governed by a wide variety of dif
ferent aesthetic strategies for organizing past events into a narrative whole.
“In other words, history is both a literary artefact (and in this sense a fic
tion) and a representation of reality”^'* Historical events are recounted in
many different forms—from relatively objective annals and chronicles to
full-fledged narratives and highly embellished stories—all of which, by defi
nition, emplot what is recounted according to a certain viewpoint as to the
proper configuration, or “meaning,” of the events in question.
Second, as history is, in a manner of speaking, “fictional,” so fiction
is more “real” than is often recognized. Fictional narratives on the order
of a novel or play have the capacity to redescribe features of human
historicity by bracketing ordinary descriptions of reality. The aim of an
imaginative text is the creative imitation of human action—even as the pur
pose of metaphor, as we saw above, is to redescribe the actual world in
terms of possibility. Yet while narrative fiction’s mimetic capacities are cre
ative—they do not offer slavish copies of the ordinary world—they remain
historically rooted in the common world of human action. Ricoeur para
doxically writes that “because history is tied to the contingent it misses the
essential, whereas poetry, not being the slave of the real event, can address
itself directly to the universal, i.e., to what a certain kind of person would
likely or necessarily say or do.”^^ Narrative fictions do have a certain truthvalue by virtue of their claim to assert something about reality—even if this
assertion is on the order of an imaginative variation on the possibilities of
everyday existence. Thus both history and fiction (as ideal types) share a
23. Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative and Hermeneutics,” in Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on
the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley, ed. John Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1983),
153.
24. Ricoeur, “The Narrative Function,” 291. See also Ricoeur’s qualified endorsement of
different narrativist models of history in Time and Narrative, 1:121-74.
25. Paul Ricoeur, “Can Fictional Narratives Be True?” Analecta Husserliana 14 (1983):
16.
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common narrative interest in describing what reality is (so history) or in re
describing what reality is like (so fiction) to the end that our being-in-time
and being-in-history might be rendered meaningful.
Analogously, Ricoeur maintains in Oneself as Another that the construc
tion of a life-story is necessary to give shape and meaning to one’s existence.
Storytelling helps make sense of the disparate parts of one’s experience.
Each life is a medley of inchoate events waiting to be told in a comprehen
sive format; each life is an incipient story waiting to be rendered intelligible
by a narrator. In scripting a life-story as one’s own, a self is born in posses
sion of a refigured identity. To write a life, or to tell a life, is to wager that
an exegesis of the self’s untold story will pay rich dividends in one’s quest
for authenticity and integrity.
According to Ricoeur, the solution to the problem of personal iden
tity rests in the distinction between identity as sameness (or idem-identity)
and identity as selfhood (or ipse-identity). Idem signifies identity as selfsubsisting permanence and uninterrupted continuity over the span of one’s
life. Ipse stands for the struggle to faithfully interpret one’s life by a sub
ject that is continually refiguring itself through the stories it appropriates
as its own. In the first case, identity is a fait accompli; in the second,
a hermeneutical process with no a priori resolution. Generally, however,
the notion of identity is used equivocatively, or with primary reference to
identity as sameness, with the result that the self is understood foundationally in terms of the Cartesian cogito, a fixed substratum that perdures
over time.^® This entitative notion of the self generates both historicist and
physicalist criticisms, neither of which is finally satisfactory according to
Ricoeur. Some anticogito thinkers (for example, Michel Foucault) contend
that insofar as there is no nonverbal core self, then the subject is noth
ing other than the sum total of the discourses practiced by its particular
culture. Similarly, some analytic philosophers (for example, Derek Parfit),
who also criticize Cartesian essentialism, argue that the subject is reducible
(without remainder) to its brain states and bodily functions. Ricoeur rejects
all three options—foundationalist, historicist, and physicalist—in favor of
a narrative hermeneutic of the subject. The self, as neither a fixed entity,
cultural cipher, nor biochemical remainder cobbles together its identity by
constructing a life-story that uses the resources of various narrative frag
ments. In the narrative interpretation of a life both history and fiction are
borrowed from; and since the references of both genres crisscross the plane
of human historicity, a life mediated by stories is a “fictive history, or if
one prefers, an historic fiction.
We have seen that because narrative fic26. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, traris. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: Univ. of Chi
cago Press, 1992), 1-39 and passim. For a summary of the argument, see Paul Ricoeur,
“Narrative Identity,” Philosophy Today 35 (1991): 73-81.
27. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 114.
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tions are imitations of human action, they can be relied upon as paradigms
for answering the question, Who am I? The “who” who asks this ques
tion must take the long route to selfhood through the “vast laboratory
of thought experiments” available to the subject in cultural stories and
symbols.^®
Is there a religious subtext to this argument? Ricoeur says “no” in the
interest of preserving the autonomy and integrity of both philosophy and
theology: just as he does not want Oneself as Another to be accused of
cryptotheology, he does not want theology founded on biblical faith to
ground itself on any cryptophilosophy. With this “conflict of the faculties”
proviso stated, however, he then teases the reader, as he often does, by go
ing on to adumbrate what a theology of the narrative self would look like
given his thesis. In the manner of Levinas, for example, he suggests that
such a theology would articulate the ways in which the self is summoned
by the other (be it the divine or human other) to realize its desire to be
by responding to the voice of the other.^^ The call of the human other,
the neighbor, for justice and compassion secures the ethical and political
aspects of forging a narrative identity. This prescriptive dimension of self
hood brings to light one of the many valences of the book’s title: my self is
constituted by the other who calls me to responsibility.
In analyzing how the self hears and responds to this call, however, a
theology of the refigured self should not take false refuge in any putative
metaphysical certainties concerning the nature of the “self” who is ad
dressed. Rather, such a theology would rely on the fragile testimonies to
divine graciousness within the biblical literatures and eschew the pseudo
security provided by attempts to prove the reality of God, or found the
self, on the basis of some onto-theological amalgam. “The dependence of
the self on a word that strips it of its glory, all the while comforting its
courage to be, delivers biblical faith from the temptation, which I am here
calling cryptophilosophical, of taking over the henceforth vacant role of
ultimate foundation.”®® Thus the theology briefly sketched out in Oneself
as Another is a theology of the summoned self—the self that relies on the
self-divesting word of the other in order to repossess itself by following the
“true fictions” biblical faith offers to the reader-disciple.
The role of figurative texts in the formation of human subjectivity is the
unifying theme that underlies Ricoeur’s writing. In this vein, he envisions re
ligious studies as a hermeneutical inquiry into the imaginative potential of
myth, symbol, and story to aid our efforts to exist with integrity. Religious
28. Ibid., 148.
.
29. For the role of the other in identity formation, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and
Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1969). Ricoeur’s use of
Levinas is developed in Oneself tis Another, 188—90 and 335—56.
30. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 25.
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traditions use ontologically potent language and imagery to illuminate all
that ultimately concerns human beings—our questions about life’s meaning,
our confrontations with death, our struggles to be at home in the universe.
Our individual and corporate worlds remain underdeveloped and impov
erished because we no longer have a public symbolic language that speaks
both to the brokenness and the intimations of transcendence in our lives.
Through hermeneutics of reduction and retrieval, Ricoeur shows how the
world’s cultural classics (including the Bible) can expansively figure rich and
full projections of another way of being in the world that liberates what is
essential by suggesting what is possible.

Outline of This Anthology
The essays collected in this volume comprise the most comprehensive over
view of Ricoeur’s writings in religion. Most of these essays have not been
previously anthologized in a volume devoted to Ricoeur’s work. While
perhaps a few of the essays will be familiar to readers, the bulk of this
collection is not well known in the English-speaking world. David Pellauer
has translated many of the essays included here expressly for this volume.
The anthology consists of writings from 1970 to the present; except in
Part Two, the essays in each section are arranged in chronological order.
Though the collection focuses on the religious aspects of Ricoeur’s recent
thought, it also serves as an introduction to many of his other interests
because his religious writings are always situated in close relation to the
wide variety of general philosophical topics that occupy his inquiries. These
collected essays constitute a rich and diverse body of thought that comple
ments Ricoeur’s writings in a variety of other fields, including philosophy,
psychology, literary criticism, and historiography. As such this collection
fills a lacuna in Ricoeur scholarship in particular, and contemporary reli
gious and philosophical thought in general, by surveying the full range of
Ricoeur’s recent religious writings in chronological and thematic fashion.
This approach allows the reader to trace the development of his thought
from his midcareer use of discourse analysis for understanding religious
language, to his subsequent concern with the role of narrative in the study
of biblical genres, to his more recent inquiries into models of personal iden
tity and the relevance of continental philosophers such as Rosenzweig and
Levinas to the contemporary task of theological reflection.
To speak of “development” in Ricoeur’s thought is to speak of exten
sions of, rather than fundamental breaks with, the themes and concerns
of his previous writings. I have suggested one such recurrent emphasis
in his overall philosophical project: the power of religious language to
metamorphize the world of the reader by opening up new possibilities
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of being-in-the-world. What is distinctive about his specifically religious
writings is the regional application of this theme to the role of scriptural
discourses—including narratives, laws, prophecies, wisdom writings, and
hymns—as occasions for challenging the reader to alternative forms of
existence.
In this vein, the particular genre that Ricoeur returns to again and
again in these essays is biblical narrative by way of his studies of narratology in general. Yet he uses and understands narrative differently from
the way many theologians use and understand narrative in the contempo
rary setting. His concern is to show how the stories of the Bible are not
one-dimensional exercises in concordance and triumph but rather multiva
lent points of intersection for a variety of discourses and their contrasting
theological itineraries. He demonstrates how much of the Bible’s narrative
and nonnarrative material speaks as readily to the ambiguity and futility of
existence as it does to the providence of God within covenant and history.
Ricoeur’s use of—and caution against—narrative for theological reflection
places him on the fringes of the camp of narrative theology per se, if by
that phrase we mean the privileging of biblical narrative as the means to
redescribing “reality within the scriptural framework rather than translat
ing Scripture into extrascriptural categories.”^^ Ricoeur is wary of assigning
final priority to any one particular construal of reality because all forms of
literary discourse (and not only biblical narrative discourse) can potentially
refigure one’s experience and offer new possibilities for understanding. Any
genred text that works figurative variations on reality by proposing an
imaginative “world” that the reader might inhabit can be said to be “re
vealed.” While the biblical stories are a medium of revelation, they are a
species of a wider revelatory function that can be participated in by any
text (biblical or otherwise) that unleashes novel alternatives for the reader.
Part One
The first part consists of Ricoeur’s general explorations into the nature of
religion. He uses methodological tools from history of religions and liter
ary criticism to analyze the articulations of religious belief through symbol
and discourse. While he does not go so far as to argue that religion is a
sui generis phenomenon, he does maintain that religious beliefs have their
own integrity and should not be reduced to explanatory schemas that fail
to account for the self-understandings of religious communities. To facili
tate the understanding of religion “on its own terms” Ricoeur argues, in
a manner similar to Ludwig Wittgenstein, that just insofar as religious be31. George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), 118.
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lief and experience are primarily expressed through various discourses, the
study of religion should begin with analyzing these modes of articulation.
“[W]hatever ultimately may be the nature of the so-called religious expe
rience, it comes to language, it is articulated in a language, and the most
appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to inquire into its
linguistic expression.
In one of the articles collected here, “Philosophy and Religious Lan
guage,” Ricoeur shows how different modes of signification—symbols,
myths, narratives, metaphors, and models—generate a surplus of meaning
in the study of religious texts. These literary forms of articulation are not
simply taxonomic devices for categorizing discourse but rather the means
by which theological meaning is produced. These forms are not merely
“decorative [with] an emotional value but no informative value.”^^ Modes
of discourse, then, are more than just classificatory codes or ornamen
tal trappings because the content of religious discourse is determined by
the literary forms employed to mediate particular theological understand
ings. The scriptural figuration of the divine life, for example, is radically
problematized by attention to the mixed genres employed by the biblical
writers. “Throughout these discourses, God appears differently each time:
sometimes as the hero of the saving act, sometimes as wrathful and com
passionate, sometimes as the one to whom one can speak in a relation of
an I-Thou type, or sometimes as the one whom I meet only in a cosmic
order that ignores me.”^‘* The advantage of using discourse analysis for
understanding religious texts is that it renders more complicated and het
erogeneous the interpretation of biblical faith. In this approach the Bible
emerges as an asymmetrical intertext of oppositional genres—genres that
alternately complement and conflict with one another—rather than a stable
book unified by a particular discourse or singular perspective.
While discourse analysis aids the interpretation of biblical literature,
comparative history of religions enables a broader understanding of re
ligious phenomena that includes textual as well as nontextual modes of
experience. In “Manifestation and Proclamation” and “The ‘Sacred’ Text
and the Community,” Ricoeur takes up the dialectic between the phe
nomenology of the sacred and the hermeneutic of the word in world
spirituality. Primordial religious communities are founded on numinous,
preverbal experiences of the sacred in nature and the cosmos, while latterday, book-centered traditions are formed by belief in an intratribal deity
and subscription to a body of iconoclastic teachings. In manifestation
communities, religious truth and meaning are universally rooted in the
32. Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” below, 35.
33. Paul Ricoeur, “Poetique et symbolique,” in Initiation a la pratique de la theologie,
vol. 1: Introduction, ed. Bernard Lauret and Francois Refoule (Paris: Cerf, 1982), 48.
34. Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” below, 41.
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correspondences between agricultural cycles and divine power, while in
proclamation traditions truth and meaning are authoritatively defined by
revealed texts that warn against any manifestation of the Wholly Other
through nature and the image.
Equally important are the distinctive temporalities characteristic of the
two types. This is the difference between backward-looking archaic time as
repetitive of the original cosmogony, and forward-oriented historical time
as the progressive anticipation of a better future. Ricoeur argues that if
these two notions of time are bifurcated into ideal types, then the one is
aesthetic, generic, cyclical, and nature-bound while the other is ethical, par
ticular, interruptive, and history-based. Lest this opposition harden into a
false dichotomy, however, Ricoeur avers that biblical religion is actually a
recombination of both temporalities; it oscillates between the celebration
of “cyclical” festivals and seasons and the testimony of the word in “lin
ear” history. One of the themes, then, of Part One is the need for biblical
religion continually to combine the clarifying precision of the word m his
tory and the cyclical modalities of the sacred in nature. Moreover, unless
proclamation traditions reactualize the rootedness of all life in sacred pat
terns and symbols, these traditions will be empty of the power and mystery
that primordial people experienced in their recurring encounters with the
numinous. “In truth, without the support and renewing power of the sa
cred cosmos and the sacredness of vital nature, the word itself becomes
abstract and cerebral.
These initial articles highlight Ricoeur’s intensive debate with Mircea
Eliade on the question of the phenomenology of comparative religions.
Ricoeur was a colleague of Eliade’s at the University of Chicago Divinity
School until Eliade’s death in 1984. While Ricoeur is greatly indebted to
Eliade for his perspicacious studies of primordial traditions, he questions
his lack of attention to the primacy of proclamation in religions founded
on a revealed scripture. “In Christianity there is a polarity of proclamation
and manifestation, which Mircea Eliade does not recognize in his homo
geneous concept of manifestation, epiphany, and so forth----1 think there
is something specific in the Hebraic and Christian traditions that gives a
kind of privilege to the word.”^^ Ricoeur borrows from Eliade (as well
as from Rudolph Otto and others) the notion that the universe is charged
with the power of the sacred; the universe signifies the numinous through
symbols and myths rooted in the depth structures of reality itself. But he
takes issue with the deployment of Eliadean analysis at the expense of an
equally powerful hermeneutic of the capacity of scriptural texts to open up
new dimensions of reality that often challenge the established patterns of
35. Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” below, 67.
36. Ricoeur, “The ‘Sacred’ Text and the Community,” below, 71.
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the sacred universe. While canonical texts need the sustenance of primor
dial symbolism, the power of such texts cannot be sufficiently accounted
for by a comparative phenomenology inattentive to the distinctiveness of
word-based religious traditions.
Part Two
The three essays selected for this part represent Ricoeur’s close readings
of the important works about religion by Kant, Rosenzweig, and Levinas.
These essays are not freestanding position papers by Ricoeur but rather
critical engagements with different philosophical approaches to religion ac
cording to their major practitioners. Ricoeur’s own constructive position on
various questions is painstakingly worked out by way of expositing each
thinker’s approach and usually is explicitly delineated only toward the end
of each essay.
The essay on Kant forms a natural pair with an earlier essay on Hegel.
The two articles give alternative answers to the question of whether the
proper aim of philosophy of religion is to secure the idea of God as a spec
ulative concept free of figurative thought, or whether its aim is to avoid
speculative theorizing in order to enable the practical realization of human
freedom. For Hegel, the inner dynamism of thought concerning the figures
and symbols of religion leads to a sublation (Aufhebuttg) of such figures in
pure conceptual thought where Spirit is self-conscious to itself. For Kant,
on the other hand, the final absorption of figurative religious thought into
speculation is not the dialectical realization of reason’s inner directional
ity but rather a transcendental illusion that should be vigorously resisted.
Such an illusion is a violation of the boundaries of reason within the con
fines of conceptually mediated sense experience. Insofar as Ricoeur upholds
the integrity of figurative modes of religious discourse against attempts to
translate such discourse into a speculative metalanguage, his sympathies lie
more with Kant’s philosophy of limits than with Hegel’s system of absolute
knowledge.
In the essay on Hegel, Ricoeur’s purpose is to examine both the evolution
of the role of figurative thinking (Vorstellung) in Hegel’s religious thought
and to establish whether such thinking is finally dissolved into concep
tual thought (Begriff) devoid of pictorial imagery. In the Phenomenology
of Spirit, Hegel puts the stress on the inadequacy of religious Vorstellung
to apprehend its subject matter; for this reason religious picture-thinking
must endure a continual process of self-realization until it reaches its final
37. See Paul Ricoeur, “The Status of ‘Vorstellung’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” in
Meaning, Truth, and God, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.; Univ. of Notre Dame
Press, 1982), 70-88. On Ricoeur’s dialogue with Kant and Hegel, see also his argument for
a “post-Hegelian return to Kant” in “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 136-45.
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consummation in conceptual thought. Prior to its final realization, this dy
namic inner process reaches its religious climax in Christianity just insofar
as Christ is the perfect symbol of the self-consciousness of Spirit in and
through its other. But because thought about this symbol remains rooted in
historical imagery, it is only partially aware of the meaning of the Spirit in
and for itself, and so it must be sublated by conceptual thought.
Ricoeur argues, however, that in spite of Hegel’s generally negative eval
uation of religious Vorstellung in the Phenomenology, figurative thinking
carries a more positive valence in Hegel’s later Berlin Lectures on the Phi
losophy of Religion. The reason for this change is that the subject matter
of the Vorstellung in question changes: the focus on biblical and christological imagery in the earlier work gives way to a valorization of the doctrine
of the Trinity in the later work as a more adequate (albeit religious) form
of speculation about Spirit. The idea of the Trinity—the interrelationship
of Father, Son, and Spirit in and for each—discloses the dynamic nature
of reality itself. Thus in the Berlin Lectures this idea mediates between the
inadequacy of religious pictorial thinking and the superiority of concep
tual thought. “Between the trinitarian expression of Christian thought and
the high dialectic of conceptual thinking there is a homology that exceeds
the shortcomings of pictorial thinking.”^® Ricoeur ends the essay by argu
ing for the importance of conceptual rigor in philosophy of religion, but
without disparaging (as Hegel often does, and especially in the Phenom
enology) the narrative and figurative dimensions of religious discourses that
have founded communities of faith and hope. As Hegel seems to call for at
the end of his Berlin Lectures, Ricoeur says that only when philosophy is
nourished by the figurative ideals of a culture’s sacred texts can it fulfill its
destiny as a medium for insight and understanding.
In the essay on Kant included here, Ricoeur maintains that Kant’s phi
losophy of religion is a hermeneutic of symbols exercised outside the
parameters of his critical philosophy. The reason for the exteriority of reli
gion to philosophy stems from the problem of the “bound will,” a problem
that is not approachable on the basis of the methodology in the three Cri
tiques. Kant argues that while an originary disposition to evil is basic to
the human condition, this disposition can only be indirectly “thought” by
interrogating the figures and myths of religious belief; it cannot be directly
“known” as an element of objective knowledge and experience.
Ricoeur’s analysis of Kant’s fundamental anthropology in Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone hews to the line of Ricoeur’s own discus
sion of the innately faulted character of human volition in his earlier poetics
of the will. Humans suffer from the loss of free will—from a propensity
to evil even though the actual performance of evil is a result of free choice
38. Ibid., 85.
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rather than “original sin.” Evil, then, is our predilection but also our re
sponsibility; we are both victimized by it and culpable for it. “We might
say, supporting Kant, that he has identified what is so upsetting in the con
fession of evil—I do not say the experience of evil—namely, the following
paradox: in each instance, we do evil; but evil was already there__ [Kant]
caught sight of the paradox of something that has always been there and
yet for which we ourselves are responsible.”^^ Kant’s response to this para
dox is drawn from what Ricoeur aptly calls the “dramaturgy” of biblical
Christology where Christ, as the supreme archetype of a person who fully
lives the moral law, is pictured as victorious over a cosmically evil antag
onist. The value of this archetype lies in its ability to figure the will (and
thereby liberate it from its predisposition to evil), not in its reference to the
life of the historical Jesus. In this sense we should say that the origin of the
Christ symbol is not in a historical event but in the figurative powers of the
moral imagination. The archetype is generated by a “schematism of hope”
in which the rational concept of a will no longer bound by evil inclinations
is rendered intelligible and applicable to experience by the concrete exam
ple of an individual who singularly embodies the autonomy of a rational
will. Again, however, Ricoeur is quick to underscore that this archetype
in Kant is a figure of the imagination and not an extension of objective
knowledge into the inner workings of Reality itself (contra Hegel). “The
archetype of a humanity well pleasing to God can be admitted only as a
practical ideal, not as a reflective moment of the absolute itself.”''®
Kant frankly admits that the origin of evil is inscrutable and that only
the infusion of supernatural grace (figured by the Christ symbol) can free
the bad will. While Kant insists on the importance of these two affirmations
for liberating the will, he does not try to reconcile them to his earlier critical
philosophy. By the same token, such confessionalist statements do not con
tradict the critical philosophy since they clearly fall outside the boundaries
of critical reason. Ricoeur concludes that Kant’s adroit use of a variety of
religious figures (Vorstellung) to interrogate the nature of human volition is
the key to the success of his project. Whereas Hegel argues that Vorstellung
in religion is inadequate to the concept of pure Spirit, Kant maintains that
the more limited task of interpreting the rich imagery of religious faith has
potential for enabling the practical realization of human freedom. Ricoeur
argues that this is the burden that should be carried by all philosophy of
religion: the explication of figures of hope as a response to the avowal of
radical evil.
The essay on Rosenzweig and that on Levinas can also be read in asso
ciation with each other. In the Rosenzweig essay, Ricoeur’s basic interest is
39. Ricoeur, “A Philosophical Hermeneutics of Religion: Kant,” below, 79.
40. Ibid., 85.

22 - INTRODUCTION
in the meaning of the rhetorical figures that underpin Rosenzweig’s philos
ophy of Judaism in The Star of Redemption. For Ricoeur the book’s central
figure is the six-pointed Star of David. This figure generates a wide range of
significations: its upward triangle stands for God at its peak with the world
and humanity at its lower angles, while its downward triangle connects the
modalities of creation, revelation, and redemption—the central themes that
form the structure of the book’s first and second parts. But the star is also
a figure of the face, both the face of humanity and the face of God. (Here
Ricoeur notes in French the affinity between figure, or form, and visage, or
face.) Insofar as the “physiognomy” of the six-pointed star can be under
stood analogically in relation to a “face” with forehead, eyes, nose, mouth,
and so on, and insofar as the face makes an absolute demand on one’s eth
ical obligations, Ricoeur regards the figure/face of the star in Rosenzweig
as the master trope for understanding both the interhuman as well as the
God-human relationship.
Ricoeur argues that the centrality of the figure of the star in Rosenzweig
positions Rosenzweig’s project closer to Levinas than Hegel. Ricoeur reads
the Star as an extended metaphor where figuration (rather than specula
tion, as in Hegel) is privileged as the primary medium for philosophical
insight. “It might even be more fruitful to compare the tie between figure
and speculation for Rosenzweig to the relation of Vorstellung (representa
tion) and Begriff (concept) for Hegel. We might then see that the relation is
something quite other than what Hegel meant. With Rosenzweig we would
have a speculation that is metaphorical throughout, a metaphorics that is
speculative throughout.In the register of a sustained “metaphorics,” Ri
coeur highlights two concepts that tie together Rosenzweig’s and Levinas’s
thought: the epiphany of the face and the criticism of totality. On the one
hand, both thinkers maintain that the other’s face generates within the sub
ject a compelling sense of responsibility for the other’s welfare; on the other,
they criticize the penchant of Western philosophers for subordinating all
experience to absolute reason. Ricoeur concludes by noting, however, that
while Levinas appears successful at escaping the sirens of totalizing philoso
phy, it is less clear whether Rosenzweig, with his facility for system building
as demonstrated by the architectonic elegance of the Star, has completely
abandoned the all-encompassing idealism he purports to have disavowed.
In the final essay of this section, Ricoeur considers the notion of “tes
timony” in Levinas’s thought in relation to the themes of height and
exteriority in Heidegger, Jean Nabert, and Levinas. He argues that a read
ing together” of these three thinkers shows an increasing reliance on the
dimensions of height and exteriority culminating in Levinas’s philosophy
of the other. At first glance Heidegger seems to assign importance to these
41. Ricoeur, “The ‘Figure’ in Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption,” below, 97.
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two elements. The subject is never coincident with itself and must rely on a
voice “beyond itself” in order to be itself; but this is the voice of conscience
within the subject and is not finally exterior to the subject. Likewise, Hei
degger s reference to the value of others exterior to oneself is ultimately
subsumed by the notion of the uncanny and the pernicious effects of be
ing in relation to the “they.” Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger’s philosophy as
characterized by an exteriority without otherness [that] corresponds to
this height without transcendence.
Nabert fares better than Heidegger
in Ricoeur’s analysis because Nabert argues for a self-divested subject who
testifies to the absolute beyond itself and who can recover its own dignity
and identity only by means of this exterior testimony. Ricoeur then analyzes
Levinas’s full turn to the transcendence and alterity of the other in rela
tion to the subject. For Levinas, subjectivity consists in existing through the
other and for the other. To take responsibility for the other, even hostage
oneself to the other, is the vocation of true selfhood. In the end, however,
Ricoeur returns to Nabert’s philosophy of consciousness as a needed coun
terpart to Levinas’s thoroughgoing stress on responsibility for the other.
Ricoeur avers that self-identity is not merely a result of one’s response to
the call of the other; it is also what must be presupposed for the call to be
heard and understood in the first place.
Part Three
Even though Parts Three and Four announce two sometimes unrelated top
ics exegesis and theology—both of these sections form a coherent whole
in Ricoeur’s development of a biblically informed theology. I have divided
the parts for heuristic purposes, but the interests of each part constitute
the dual foci of a single ellipse. For Ricoeur the disciplines of biblical inter
pretation and theological reflection operate within the same gravitational
space; the complementary and contrasting genres of Hebrew and Chris
tian Scriptures. Theology, first and foremost, is a hermeneutical exercise
at work upon the multiple modes of discourse within the Bible. Closer to
exegesis than philosophy, theology is a nonspeculative interpretation of the
founding discourses of Jewish and Christian faith without the benefit of any
rational foundation upon which to base such an enterprise. The temptation
of theology has always been to ignore its rootedness in the originary—albeit
provincial—languages of biblical religion in favor of a more philosophical
orientation. As rational thought-about-God, theology would then be able
to justify itself as an independent exercise in reason and argument and go
beyond its provenance in the peculiar imagery and language of religious
42. Ricoeur, “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker of Testimony,” below, 110.
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faith. Ricoeur, however, rejects this homology between theology and phi
losophy and argues instead for the reinvigoration of theological discourse
on the basis of biblical hermeneutics. Theology, then, is biblical theology
but not in the sense that that phrase is often understood with reference to
neoorthodox thought, as we will see below.
Part 3 brings together Ricoeur’s various exegetical writings. The four
essays that have been selected are examples of his theory of biblical her
meneutics as well as case studies of his actual readings of biblical texts
Though a philosopher, Ricoeur seeks to avoid theory-heavy methods of
biblical reading in favor of a text-immanent approach that projects pos
sibilities of meaning occasioned by the texts themselves. “The question is
rather whether there is, before the philosophical-theological interpretation,
an interpretation that would not be an interpretation of the text or an inter
pretation about the text, but an interpretation in the text and through the
text.”'*^ This intrinsic approach is governed by sensitivity to the traditions
of interpretation already at work within the texts under consideration. The
Bible for Ricoeur is a multilayered mass of disparate literary traditions; a
successful hermeneutic plumbs the depths of these textual strata and brings
to light dimensions of sedimented meaning previously hidden and opaque^
He alternately refers to this excavation process as a depth semantics,
a “semiotics of texts,”'*^ or a “synchronic reading [that] complete[s] the
diachronic approach of the historical-critical method.”^" Whatever the sta
tus of the recounted events in the Bible as historical occurrences, these
events now enjoy a textual existence at some remove from their antecedent
origins. Their meaning is now a product of their inscription within a net
work of texts that alternately support and displace one another in an
intertextual whole. Whatever their original Sitz-im-Leben, it is now the me
diation of these events through the Sitz-im-Wort of various literary genres
that constitutes their present-day significance. Historical criticism can helpfully reconstruct the probable historical “occasions” that generated later
literary traditions, but only a synchronic study of the interanimating con
junctions and dislocations between various modes of discourse can explain
the complexities of meaning within the Bible.
In conversation with both structuralist (Vladimir Propp) and formalist
(A.-J. Greimas) analysts, Ricoeur’s semiotic approach considers the codes
and oppositions that govern the transformations at work in the biblical
texts. In “On the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1—2:4a,” he isolates the theme of
separation as the literary convention that structures the opening creation
hymn into a series of dynamic oppositions: order and chaos, night and
43.
44.
45.
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day, plants and animals. This approach sets up a nature-centered rather
than human-centered reading of the Genesis story. Such an interpretation
clashes with the historical approach of the neoorthodox biblical theology
movement (inspired by thinkers such as Karl Barth and Gerhard von Rad)
that subordinated the creation account to the role of a prologue within the
overall narrative space of the Hexateuch. Apropos to this Heilsgeschichte
orientation, the creation of humankind is the crowning high point of the
creation story. Ricoeur disagrees with the neoorthodox approach, however,
and argues instead for a literary interpretation of the Priestly creation story
that construes the story as an ecological text. Thus Genesis 1 is best read
as a nonanthropocentric ordering of all life-forms into a cosmic biosphere
that precedes and envelops the salvation-history account of the Yahwist
redactors.
At stake in this recovery of the syntactical patterns that govern the song
of creation in Genesis is the preservation of the integrity of nonnarrative
sensibilities vis-a-vis the overall narrative shape of the Hebrew and Chris
tian Scriptures. While narrative constitutes the “most visible framework”
for biblical understanding, it is always balanced by its deep connections
with other modes of articulation.'*^ In “Biblical Time” Ricoeur argues that
the biblical message may appear to be moderated by an extended and
coherent unilinearity; in fact, however, progressive time is consistently frac
tured by nonlinear modes of scriptural temporality. Indeed, the biblical time
line of a sometimes facile covenantal history is continuously interrupted by
the ethical demands of legal discourse, the radically open and eschatolog
ical character of prophetic discourse, the cyclical and immemorial nature
of wisdom writings, and so forth. The same point is made in this section’s
other essays. Ricoeur demonstrates in his reading of the Synoptic parables
of the wicked husbandmen and the sower and the seed in “The Bible and
the Imagination,” and in his hermeneutic of the Gospel of Mark in “Inter
pretive Narrative,” that the promise of a historical master story to explain
all experience is a chimera. Both the parables and Mark’s Gospel function
as cautionary tales against naive trust in the power of narrative emplotment
to render intelligible the aporetic nature of experience.
This collection of Ricoeur’s essays concerning the theory and practice
of biblical hermeneutics reflects both stability and change in his exegetical
work over the past twenty-five years. All these works are characterized by
the use of literary analysis over and against the regnant forms of historical
criticism practiced then and now. But the most recent piece, entitled “Inter
pretive Narrative,” reflects the progression in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics from
structuralism (so characteristic of his Genesis exegesis) to poststructuralism
(especially through his current use of the work of Frank Kermode and
47. Ibid., 179.
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John Dominic Crossan). Now not only does narrative create meaning in
recombinations with other modes of discourse, but, moreover, in its cross
pollinations with the counternarrative stress on secrecy and futility, it also
subverts straight-ahead literary and theological coherence by obfuscating
what it purports to elucidate. “Is it not the case that we must say that
the narrative not so much elucidates things as obscures them in the sense
that its manner of narratively interpreting the kerygma is to reinforce the
enigmatic aspect of the events themselves?”"** In a postmodern culture, the
pathos and promise of a Ricoeurian depth semiotics are its ability to bring
to light the darkness and opacity that shadow even our most prized sacred
stories.
Part Four
The essays in this section bring together Ricoeur’s theological writings with
reference to his literary analysis of the Bible’s disparate modes of discourse.
The irony of this collection is that while Ricoeur is well known for his theo
logical writings, he has always been uncomfortable with being labeled a
theologian. The reason for this discomfort is his suspicion that theologians
(as well as philosophers) often fall prey to the tendency to homogenize the
Bible’s semantic polyphony by way of articulating a body of speculative
concepts divorced from the originary discourses of Jewish and Christian
Scripture. Two of the essays in this section—“Naming God” and “Toward
a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties stress
how attention to biblical genre diversity is necessary for a multifaceted
understanding of the divine life. Again the focus falls on the confluence
of narrative and nonnarrative discourses, but now with reference to an
enriched understanding of God. Before God is defined in univocal terms
as Being under the control of a particular metaphysical system, Ricoeur
maintains that God is first “named” polyphonically in the medley of di
verse biblical genres. “The naming of God, in the originary expressions of
faith, is not simple but multiple. It is not a single tone, but polyphonic. The
originary expressions of faith are complex forms of discourse as diverse as
narratives, prophecies, laws, proverbs, prayers, hymns, liturgical formulas,
and wisdom writings. As a whole, these forms of discourse name God. But
they do so in various ways.”"*^ Reflection alongside, not away from, this
polyphony should be the presupposition and telos of all theological work.
The use of discourse analysis sensitizes thought about God to the zones
of indeterminacy and irruptions of radical discontinuity within the texts
that first “name” God for the believing community. Unfortunately, how48. Ricoeur, “Interpretive Narrative,” below, 199.
49. Ricoeur, “Naming God,” below, 224.
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ever, theology often proceeds as if the salvation-history paradigm it has
created—that is, the enclosure of all reality within the creation and eschaton of biblical history—is exhaustive of the full meaning of the Scriptures.
While the Bible can be read as a seamless exercise in narrative coherence, an
extended “Christian pattern,” such an interpretation ignores the Bible’s fete
du sens (festival of meaning) by suppressing the disjunctions that contradict
the seeming unity of the all-encompassing plot.^® “[TJhis ‘Christian pattern’
tends to abolish the peripeties, dangers, failures, and horrors of history for
the sake of a consoling overview provided by the providential schema of
this grandiose narrative. Concordance finally conquers discordance.
Ricoeur’s point, as we saw in his papers in Part Three, is that there is more
than narrative coherence at work in the biblical naming of God—or, better,
that it is only as narrative is interanimated by its cross-fertilizations with
other modes of discourse that it can effectively make meaning.
This recurrent emphasis on the interplay between narrative and non
narrative echoes a theme that appears almost as an aside at the conclusion
of Ricoeur’s multivolume Time and Narrative. The book’s working thesis
concerning the potential of narrative to humanize time is problematized
by a final reflection on the temporality of wisdom discourse. The sapien
tial literature of Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations challenges
the totalizing impulses of narrative literatures that purport to emplot all
experience on a time line with a clear beginning, middle, and end. Wisdom
contends that life in media res is riddled with such brokenness and “vanity”
that it can never be subsumed under the hegemony of the supreme plot—
even the plot of the Deuteronomic History. In the contest between narrative
and wisdom, new possibilities of being-in-time are unleashed that question
easy resolutions of the problem of existence according to the symmetry
of the master story. We need stories in order to make sense of temporal
existence, but stories unaided by the tonic of wisdom degenerate into sim
plifying life’s insoluble ambiguities. Wisdom is attuned to the fragility and
suffering of existence in a way that narrative is not. “It is not for narra
tive to deplore the brevity of life, the conflict between love and death, the
vastness of a universe that pays no attention to our lament.
Without
wisdom, narrative inevitably drifts toward a triumphalism insensitive to
the power of time to rewrite one’s personal plots—and even destroy the
putative narrative coherence of one’s life.
The two essays on hope and evil in this section make a similar point.
50. Paul Ricoeur, “Contribution d’une reflexion sur le langage a une theologie de la
parole,” in Exegese et hermeneutique: Parole de Dieu, ed. Xavier Leon Dufour (Paris: Seuil,
1971), 315.
51. Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties,”
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Both essays take their point of departure in the failure of Hegel s dialectic
to subsume negativity under the optimism of absolute knowledge. Anachronistically, Ricoeur highlights the value of Kant’s attempt to break open
Hegel’s closed system by arguing for Kant’s extension of thought beyond
the limits of what can be known with rational certitude. It is not possible
to know with finality whether one’s hopes are ultimately illusory or in fact
grounded in a final resolution of life’s aporias, but the wager of religious
hope (without the benefit of final certainty) can nevertheless be satisfying
for the one who suffers the vagaries of aporetic existence. Correspondingly,
this tack spells new directions for the question of theodicy; Ricoeur pro
poses a practical response to the problem of evil, rather than a theoretical
solution. While the “false clarity of an apparently rational explanation””
for unmerited suffering and evil is the standard approach to theodicy, Ri
coeur argues that only an affective or performative confrontation of evil is
adequate to the problem. Returning again to the power of sapiential litera
ture he argues that wisdom is the right source for a theodicy in the mode of
feelings and catharsis. Thus a theology in a practical register—consisting of
mourning, complaint against God, and the exercise of faith in spite of evil—
is the best hope for the sufferer who has moved beyond the pseudosecurity
of onto-theological optimism and speculation.
In “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Pro
phetic Vocation,” Ricoeur again takes up the question of selfhood that
underpins the bulk of his philosophical writing. This essay is the com
panion piece to the unpublished paper entitled “The Self in the Mirror of
Scripture,” which is not included here.” Together these two pieces were
part of Ricoeur’s Gifford Lectures of 1986 that formed the basis of Oneself
us Another, Ricoeur says that he has not included these essays in the larger
volume because he wants to preserve the autonomy and integrity of two
related, but distinctive, modes of discourse: theology and philosophy. Thus
the “Summoned Subject” essay and its unpublished counterpart provide a
revealing angle of vision into the religious import of the larger project of
Oneself as Another.
The connection between Oneself us Another and the essay included here
is most obvious in the final chapter of Oneself as Another, What Ontology
in View?” In this chapter Ricoeur identifies conscience as the place where
selfhood is constituted: in the interior voice of obligation each person is
called into responsibility for oneself and the other. Conscience is a formal
feature of existence; it is the generic capacity to discriminate between com
peting values in one’s relations to others. In the Summoned Subject this
53. Ricoeur, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” below, 254.
54. See also the related essay, “Pastoral Praxeology, Hermeneutics, and Identity,” below,
which examines the problem of self-identity in the context of practical theology.
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moral capacity is examined through the different registries of the prophetic
vocation in the Scriptures. The prophet is the model of the “mandated sub
ject” who works for the health of the community by responding to the call
to withdraw from the community in order to be sent back to the same.
Ricoeur continues that the power of conscience has other theological im
plications as well. Indeed, conscience is now valorized as the contact point
between the word of God and human beings. “Conscience is thus the an
thropological presupposition without which ‘justification by faith’ would
remain an event marked by radical extrinsicness. In this sense, conscience
becomes the organ of the reception of the kerygma, in a perspective that
remains profoundly Pauline.Without conscience, the voice that sum
mons the self to its responsibilities falls on deaf ears. In Ricoeur’s earlier
writings the imagination played the role of a sort of praeparatio evangelica for the reception of the divine word.^^ While not denying this previous
emphasis, the focus is now on the subject’s moral capacity to select which
figures of the imagination best enable the subject’s care and concern for the
other. The work of imagination and the testimony of conscience together
empower the subject to appropriate the command to take responsibility for
the other’s welfare.
The emphasis on the summoned self marks a return to—and extension
beyond—Ricoeur’s formative anthropological concerns in his unfinished
trilogy on the will, but the stress now falls on the specific language of
conscience rather than on the structures of volition in general. Perhaps we
could say that his Gifford Lectures now complete his earlier poetics of the
will. Again as before, the human as moral agent is both free and deter
mined: free to exercise the autonomy of conscience but delimited since the
subject is able to do so only within the confines of the symbolic matrixes
that dispose the subject prior to entering consciousness. The resumption
of the dialectic between freedom and finitude, so critical to Ricoeur’s ear
lier trilogy, as well as the more recent analysis of conscience, reflects the
lifelong impact of Levinas on Ricoeur’s thought. For Levinas authentic self
hood is constituted by the self’s response to its being summoned—indeed,
determined—by the call of the other. “But responsibility for another comes
from what is prior to my freedom__ It does not allow me to constitute
myself as an I think, substantial like a stone, or, like a heart of stone, ex
isting in and for oneself.
While Ricoeur makes clear his disagreements
with Levinas in “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker of Testimony” and the final
chapter of Oneself as Another, he agrees with Levinas that the recovery of
55. Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic
Vocation,” below, 272, and “The Logic of Jesus, the Logic of God,” below.
56. See, for example, Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology,” below.
57. Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 180.

30 ~ INTRODUCTION
the phenomenon of moral agency as care for another is the fundamental
task in the journey toward selfhood. Without the assurance of an ultimate
foundation (religious or otherwise) upon which to found oneself, the self,
summoned by the divine entreaty mediated by conscience, wagers that fi
delity to this entreaty will open out to a future of expansive possibilities
for itself and others.
Part Five
The essays in this final section consist of sermons and writings in moral the
ology; they represent the practical extension of Ricoeur’s religious thought
into the areas of theological ethics, interreligious dialogue, and pastoral
care. As with his other writings, these occasional pieces set out a counter
metaphysical approach to religious thought and praxis grounded in the
diversity of biblical discourses. Ricoeur argues that theological ethics must
begin with the complicated—even contradictory—expressions of virtue and
morality within a religious tradition’s founding texts before it turns to
a conceptual analysis of the meaning of these expressions. He criticizes
analytic moral philosophers—from Gene Outka to John Rawls—for sys
tematically “leveling off” the oddities and discontinuities within the Bible’s
ethical teachings in order to iterate coherent philosophical theories of the
good. His point is that general theoretical approaches to ethics both (1) ig
nore biblical polysemy and (2) offer solutions to the aporetics of moral
philosophy that are insensitive to the practical difficulties of crafting an
ethical existence. As we saw in the previous sections, Ricoeur is consis
tently wary of overarching theological systems that operate independently
from their base in the primary documents of religious faith because such
systems are ultimately false to the fractured character of human experience.
Two of the essays collected here (“Ethical and Theological Considera
tions on the Golden Rule” and “Love and Justice”) and one of the sermons
(“The Logic of Jesus, the Logic of God”) analyze the biblical aporia be
tween the extravagant commandment of Jesus to love one’s enemies and
give to the other whatever is asked for, and the rule of reciprocal justice
that seeks to balance the other’s needs against the subject’s own welfare.
Understood oppositionally, the gospel command to love the enemy is ex
travagant, unilateral, asymmetric, and excessively other-directed, while the
biblical ideal of justice is rule-governed, bilateral, reciprocal, and thought
fully self-reflexive. Ricoeur, however, argues against allowing this polarity
to harden into an absolute antinomy and suggests instead the need for an
“unstable equilibrium”^® between the nonutilitarian demand to love at all
58. Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” below, 324.
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costs and the practical efficacy of adjudicating competing interests in so
cieties governed by the rule of law. This mediation allows for a mutual
interpretation of each enterprise in the light of the other, so that the im
possible command to practice pure altruism can be reintegrated, but never
subsumed, into the reciprocal codes of social justice and penal law that
order modern life.
The biblical teaching that forms the background of this dialectic between
love and justice is that all human beings are codependent members of an
originary and ongoing creation that is nurturing and benevolent. Draw
ing from the Reformed tradition the idea of a power over all greater than
ourselves, Ricoeur maintains that the goodness of creation under divine
governance teaches us to be good to one another. “[W]e set in the fore
most place the sense of our radical dependence on a power that precedes
us, envelops us, and supports us— Each of us is not left face-to-face with
another human being, as the principle of morality taken in isolation seems
to imply. Rather nature is between us, around us—not just as something to
exploit but as an object of solicitude, respect, and admiration. The sense of
our radical dependence on a higher power thus may be reflected in a love
for the creature. Ricoeur’s creation-centered approach to the tension be
tween love and justice harks back to his earlier ecological exegesis of Gen.
1:1—2:4a. Creation precedes law, and practitioners of the law are reminded
that the divine legislation is a gift like the creation itself. Understanding
the gifted character of biblical obligation ensures that the performance of
justice will not degenerate into calculative self-interest, on the one hand,
and that the commandment to love the enemy will not slide into allowing
oneself to become a victim of the other, on the other hand.
Two of the shorter pieces in this section, “Whoever Loses Their Life for
My Sake Will Find It” and “The Memory of Suffering,” reprise the role
of wisdom discourse to illuminate the nature of the human condition. The
first essay uses a wisdom interpretation of the gospel paradox that losing
one’s life is tantamount to finding one’s life. The paradox teaches humility
and warns against the pride of false security, even the security of religious
knowledge, as a foundation for discipleship. Ricoeur says the gospel para
dox only makes sense as an invitation to give up one’s trust in God as the
guarantor of absolute knowledge and instead trust in the weakness of the
cross as the key to a meaningful existence.
The question of trust without security is a theme in the second essay
as well. This paper was first delivered in Chicago to commemorate the
Holocaust on Yom Ha-Shoah, 1989; it reads as a pastoral response to
the wisdom theodicy adumbrated in “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and
Theology” and the discussion of victimage in chapter 9 of Time and Nar59. Ricoeur, “Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule,” below, 297.
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rative, volume 3. Ricoeur suggests that retelling the stories of the victims
of the Shoah is a moral duty that gives a voice to those who were de
nied their voices. This retelling should avoid, however, the temptation of
an explanatory system that would try to make theological sense out of
the death camps. While the Bible does offer a theodicy of retribution in
which the victims, because of their faithlessness, are held responsible for the
violence inflicted upon them, Ricoeur argues instead for a wisdom theod
icy of lamentation and anger where the perennial cries of Why me? and
How long? are seen as the most adequate responses to unmitigated evil.
“Whereas the theory of retribution makes victims and murderers equally
guilty, the lamentation reveals the murderers as murderers and victims as
victims. Then we may remember the victims for what they are: namely,
the bearers of a lamentation that no explanation is able to mitigate.”^®
The link between punishment and sin in a retribution theodicy animates
a monstrous logic that holds victims and victimizers together as responsible
for the Shoah. As we saw in Part Four, Ricoeur offers the alternative of a
theodicy of complaint, nourished by biblical wisdom, as the most promising
response to events that crush the human spirit and defy final explanation.
The essays in this volume demonstrate the value of Ricoeur’s wager on
the power of the founding myths and discourses of Western culture to
enable the task of existence. In particular, Ricoeur’s religious writings sug
gest that a contrapuntal reading of Judaism’s and Christianity’s originary
scriptural texts offers the best hope for attuning oneself to the different,
sometimes irreconcilable, “worlds” one might inhabit in the journey to
ward selfhood. Nuanced readings of these texts enable one to become an
apprentice to the various forms of identity-formation within the Bible that
can empower the move from being a nomad without hope to a storyteller
of one’s own life. This journey to selfhood demands that one compose sev
eral autobiographical plots and counterplots, in conversation with different
literary genres, in order to make sense of the origin and destiny of one’s
personal odyssey. While narrative discourse offers the reader the promise
of a stable and seamless self emplotted by the Bible’s master stories, non
narrative biblical discourse reminds one that the scripturally refigured self
can never escape the aporias and discordances of daily existence. We are
readers and writers of our own lives, subjects and authors of our own
biographies, and our solace is in being able to weave, with freedom and
imagination, our fragmented selves into the wider cloth of the biblical
tapestry.
Mark I. Wallace
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